U. S. – Russia International Relations

(A Brief History)

Are the United States and Russia irreconcilable enemies? Are there principled fundamental matters which impede friendly relations between the USA and Russia? Was the Cold War real, or was it a mere political stunt? Is NATO still relevant? Do we still need NATO today?

These are some of the questions historians face when researching the issue of international relations between Russia and the United States. In this brief essay, I approach the topic from a critical perspective and provide readers with my findings concerning the questions asked.

The United States and Russia established diplomatic relations in 1807.i Although in its struggle against England the United States sought support from the Russians as early as 1780,ii the much coveted Russian recognition of the statehood of the United States would have to wait 23 years.iii

The first U. S. diplomatic Mission to Russia was headed by Francis Dana, who arrived in St. Petersburg in August 1781. However, according to the US Department of State, “Diplomatic ties to Britain prevented Russia from accepting Dana's credentials”.iv

In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson commissioned Levett Harris, “as the first official representative to Russia”.v Following the formal approval of diplomatic relations by the heads of State in 1807, protocols concluded two years later with the formal presentation of credentials. Andrei Dashkov appeared before President Madison, and John Quincy Adams appeared before Tsar Alexander.vi

e were days of thunder, when the schism of Europe settled. France and England became the Allies and formed a barrier to safeguard the Ottoman Empire. The Allies thus deterred Russia from accomplishing what they perceived as the potential resurrection of the Byzantine Empire.

During those days England adopted its centuries old doctrine of the “balance of power”,vii a theory which still governs British and Allies foreign policy. Yet Russia remained cautious, hoping in her own views that somehow her Christian sisters would come to their senses and support a reasonable approach to the Eastern Question. But they did not.

As the U. S. entry into WWII prompted its fall onto the same influence which directed British and French policy, relations between Russia and the United States inherited such schism. The apparent British and French betrayal of Christianity in defense of the Ottoman Empire was the historical origin of the rift that fractured Europe.

This betrayal was apparent, I stress, as neither the French nor the British betrayed Christianity. Influences in control of their respective governments imposed the counter-Christianity policy. As the United States joined the Allies, the birth of NATO ensured the fracture of Europe permanently.

The annals of the U. S. Department of State show that the schism in the US-Russia relations is rather new when compared with the rift between the original Allies and Russia. Contrary to popular belief, the historical record shows that the United States kept a productive relationship with Russia. Many instances in the historical record demonstrate the amicable relations between the United States and Russia.

Some examples are:

• Russia moderated disputes between the U. S. and England concerning the implementation of the Treaty of Ghent (1820-21);
• The Russian-American Commercial Treaty of 1832;
• American companies built the Moscow-St. Petersburg Railroad in 1842;
• The American-Russian Commercial Company of 1853;
• The United States pro-Russia humanitarian role in the Crimean War (1854-55);
• The American construction of Russia’s naval ships in 1857.viii

In addition, the American Government kept good relations with the Russian settlements in California (1821). Another instance of cooperation between the two countries was the purchase of Alaska.

History shows the U. S. and Russia kept warm diplomatic relations through WWI until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.ix From then on, relations between the United and Russia deteriorated rapidly. The United States refused to grant recognition to the Bolshevik government until 1933.x

It seems ironic that the U. S. would cooperate with the Bolsheviks during WWII, as the US State Department explains that such cooperation was out of necessity, in order to counter a greater common threat as Europe faced off Adolf Hitler.xi

A controversial character, Adolf Hitler’s memory counts with its fair share of detractors and supporters. To his constituents, Hitler was a hero who unmasked those who had stolen Austria, and were doing so in the rest of Germany. His detractors describe him as a monster who caused the deaths of millions.

After the Allies’ victory over Nazi Germany, a new confrontation of perhaps greater geopolitical scope ensued between the Bolsheviks and the United States.

Soviet expansionism challenged the objectives of the balance of power doctrine. Communists incorporated many of the Christian Orthodox territories of the defunct Ottoman Empire. They also incorporated the Eastern territories wrestled from the Golden Horde, creating a massive Communist empire that rivaled the territorial expansion of the Byzantine Empire.

Communism’s aggressive proselytism became a menace for Western Europe, as Russia expanded its geopolitical influence across the world in Asia, Africa, Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas.

The boldness of Communist expansionism exacerbated tensions with its former WWII allies, setting the stage for the decades long show-down known in history as The Cold War.

I make a distinction of the Cold War as an international relations conflict instead of a diplomatic relations war. On the formal diplomatic realm, relations between the U. S. and Russian remained fundamentally unchanged from what had been with the Bolsheviks in 1933, before the two countries cooperated in WWII.

Evidence of that are:

• There was never a declaration of war;xii
• Aggression was hidden beneath the veil of revolutions, espionage, etc;xiii
• Military confrontations were indirect through proxy armies of satellite governments;xiv
• There was mutual participation in friendly activities like sports, cultural and scientific events;xv
• Both countries maintained official embassies in one another;
• Both countries maintained mutual if restricted commercial trade;
• They cooperated in Space exploration;xvi
• They negotiated several treaties establishing bilateral responsibilities;xvii

The superpowers kept diplomatic relations even if at face value. But the formality was fundamental as both countries were aware of the danger of direct confrontation.

Direct confrontation took place, however; but not by military means. Diplomatic channels were open where protests and mutual denunciations were common.

At times, however, tensions boiled close to military confrontation. An example was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Such setback, nevertheless, should be understood as the exception, and not the rule. As a direct military confrontation was imminent, both countries rushed to diplomatic solutions. This fact indicates, as some experts suggest, that the crisis could have been a bluff.xviii

The Cuban crisis enhanced the status of the U. S. and Russia as the superpowers of the world. That was the effect of the crisis, regardless of its degree of authenticity. Enhanced status both countries would enjoy for some 30 more years until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

I am not trying to play down the seriousness of the Cold War. But I do suggest we understand it within the context of the facts.

The Cold War affected nations around the world. It divided the world into three groups: USA and the West, Communists, and countries not aligned.xix

Western Europe played a major role in the Cold War. The participation of Western Europe in the Cold War was spearheaded by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO.

According to the U. S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations to provide collective security against the Soviet Union.”xx

The article by the Office of the Historian enumerates post-WWII events which suggested the necessity for the involvement of the United States in protecting the Security of Western Europe.

Examples of such events were:

• Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan;
• Communist coup in Czechoslovakia;
• Civil war in Greece;
• Instability in Turkey; and,
• Russian blockade of West Berlin.xxi

Beyond the security concerns in Western Europe, the article indicates the United States worried that “the countries of Western Europe might deal with their security concerns by negotiating with the Soviets.”xxii The implication suggests a concern of the United States for preventing the expansion of the Soviet Union’s influence in Western Europe played a significant role in the formation of NATO.

By the admission of the US Department of State, Soviet Communists posed two major threats, which constituted the justification for the creation of NATO; one was ideological, the other military.xxiii

Since the collapse of Communism obliterated both threats, the continued existence of NATO now seems unjustified.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, however, holds a much broader view of its origins, especially on the justification for its continued post-Cold War existence. In A Short History of NATO, NATO states that, “It is often said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This is only partially true. In fact, the Alliance’s creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration. [emphasis added]”xxiv

NATO concedes to the relevance of the argument against its continuance, as its historians articulated a direct answer, “NATO endured because while the Soviet Union was no more, the Alliance’s two other original if unspoken mandates still held: to deter the rise of militant nationalism and to provide the foundation of collective security that would encourage democratisation and political integration in Europe”xxv.

NATO’s answer, although responding to the issues standing in its way, creates more questions than it answers.

A first concern deals with the article’s use of the words “original unspoken mandates”, in relation to NATO’s purposes. Such words bring into the discussion two important aspects. The first aspect conveys a sense of secrecy. The second, a sense of generalized authority. Was there an unspoken agenda behind the creation of NATO? Was such unspoken agenda authoritative upon all of Europe?

A second concern of mine focuses on the nature of the “unspoken mandates”. The creation of a mammoth military force to “encourage democratisation” and Globalization in Europe, seems a contradiction in principle. “Unspoken mandates” kept concealed from the public’s eye seems hypocritical.xxvi

Using overwhelming military force to “encourage” democracy is a contradiction in principle because Democracy is supposed to be an expression of the free will of a people, as opposed to a foreign imposition by the force of arms. Force implies coercion. Where there is coercion there is no freedom. The same applies to the formation process of any other political initiative.

In other words, Democracy must be democratic, both the political system and the political process.

A free, democratic process is an independent process as a free country is an independent country and a free nation is an independent sovereign nation. Foreign intervention is excluded.

Even in cases where significant sectors of a population want to engage democracy, a democratic process is still a nationally sovereign process that invokes a nation’s independence, sovereignty and self-determination.

For if democracy is imposed on a people by foreign military forces, the resulting formula may receive the label of “Democracy”, but it will lack its substance.

Relevant cases in this context are Iraq, Afghanistan, the countries affected by the so-called “Arab Spring”, and the ongoing Syrian civil war.

Democracy therefore cannot be “encouraged” by the formation of gigantic multinational forces that establish the permanent “strong presence” of foreign soldiers within the territory of sovereign nations.

In the absence of the original threat of Soviet invasion of Europe, NATO therefore becomes a foreign occupation force directed by illegal “mandates” to support political agendas that violate the sovereignty of the peoples of Europe. For the lack of cause renders the enterprise causeless, and therefore, unnecessary and unjustified.

Yet another concern of mine is the implied assumption of NATO as a force of political militancy. The fact that such militancy remains committed to the seemingly pious causes of the “democratisation and political integration in Europe” does not change its nature as political militancy. Political militancy backed by a nuclear arsenal no country of Europe is able to defend itself from.

One last concern of mine relates to the source origin of such “unspoken mandates”. For the quality of “unspoken” suggests sources that are not apparent to the public eye. This may support the suspicion that influences which origin remain concealed to the public eye may actually be the true commanders of NATO.

Otherwise, why would the “mandates” remained unspoken, or perhaps implied in the wording of the NATO Treaty, which I personally doubt?

I concede basing my concerns on non-official means of NATO communication. The history article I cite is academic. It was not a statement of policy by NATO.

I sustain the article’s historical value, however. Official documents pertaining to “unspoken mandates” of NATO would likely entail some degree of secrecy classification. Furthermore, the public should not expect written policy statements of NATO to contain “unspoken” anything, as once written, any subject would have been “spoken” of.

I hold the “unspoken mandates” wording of the NATO history article as valid and relevant textual evidence supporting the points I made so far. Additional supporting evidence of such points comes from the most unlikely of primary sources: The NATO treaty itself.

The mere fact that the North Atlantic Treaty was agreed upon by its members in its written form, incorporates the implied exclusion of “unspoken mandates”. The mandates of the North Atlantic Treaty are in the public domain. Unspoken mandates therefore have no basis on the treaty, fact which removes them from adequate legal basis.

Furthermore, articles 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty establishes the conditions upon which the Treaty authorizes its use of military force, and article 6 defines in specific terms the geography of the treaty’s scope.xxvii Both articles support the premise that NATO has no business intervening in the internal affairs of non-NATO countries. They clearly establish that NATO is not the Democracy police of Europe. No such thing exists, and it should stay that way.

In fact, none of the fourteen articles of the Treaty lends its support, expressed or implied, to NATO’s newly acquired political militancy, which I interpret as resulting from a desperate effort to maintain an alliance which has outlived its legally authorized purposes. NATO was medicine for an illness which has since relapsed. It was created to counter an enemy that no longer exists. The fact holds the Warsaw Pact is over!

The Russian government seems to join me in this line of thought. According to Russian Government records,xxviii then Russian Prime Minister, Honorable Vladimir Putin, during a highly publicized 2009 meeting with then NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, stressed the point that Russia and NATO can collaborate “to combating international terrorism, controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehicles for these weapons, and fighting organized crime and illegal drug trafficking”.xxix

Such proposal implies a fundamental redefinition of NATO’s mission. Such implication suggests by way of necessity that NATO current mission, as stated in the North Atlantic Treaty, is therefore outdated. This is consistent with the point I arduously labor to drive home.

The “unspoken mandates” may imply that underlying reasons exist, which were not part of the original discourse when NATO was formed. I sustain that such reasons exist. I further suspect that those undisclosed reasons were not part of the public discourse at the time of NATO’s birth, but were likely part of the original intentions of the influences who pushed for the signing of the treaty. I am convinced the unspoken reasons of such influences concern the Bishop of Constantinople.

I thus sustain that Communism served as the initial justification for the derailment of relations between the U. S. and Russia. But the influences that lead England and France to oppose Russia since the 18th Century extended their tentacles onto the United States during WWII. Communism was replaced as a reason for the schism by the global interests of those influences. The collapse of Communism, as a result, did not constitute the removal of the true cause of the schism, as the previously mentioned influences still remained.

The fact that NATO is operational a quarter century after the collapse of Communism lends support to our premise, as Victor Mauer tacitly agrees, “History suggests that once alliances succeed in their primary purpose, i.e. to contain the common enemy, they disband. How then do we account for NATO's post-Cold War survival?”xxx Daniel Rotfelf (2007) states a similar line of thought, “Usually, after the mission is accomplished and new historical circumstances come into play, all institutions are confronted with the question: What now?”xxxi

Although Communism collapsed, NATO expands. I am not alone here, as “several authors have thrown into question the strategic purpose of the Alliance's enlargement policies.”xxxii The authors question the wisdom of such enlargement, as “it is precisely the Alliance's new roles and missions in a transformed strategic environment that do not hold much attraction for those seeking to join NATO (italics by this author)”.xxxiii

One more case in history lending support to my thesis is perhaps the first instance when NATO participated in active combat. NATO’s participation in the Balkan war was a stretching of the North Atlantic Treaty, or an implied disclosure of its “unspoken mandates” and true purposes. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty establishes that NATO will react in defense of its members only.xxxiv No member of NATO was attacked in the Balkan case. Why did NATO intervene? And how does NATO’s intervention affect U. S. - Russia relations?

I already stated that England, France, and, since WWII, the USA obey to the same influences. Those influences historically opposed Christianity. Russians and their government recently rekindled their love for Orthodox Christianity, and for the Bishop of Constantinople. This explains the antagonism of those influences who control the U. S. and NATO, towards Russia. There seems to be no other reason.

Proof to this effect is the U. S. Department of State’s 2014 Report on International Religious Freedom .xxxv The report exemplifies instances of the sort of “nationalism” that the NATO history article claims NATO has an “unspoken mandate” to suppress. The report appears to be impregnated with pro-Human Rights, pro-Globalization, anti-Russia, and anti-Orthodox Christianity propaganda. It ignores fourteen-hundred years of history, as it seems to assume that the United States and Russia were born and raised into non-religious secular democracies. Assumption which in both cases is counter historical.

In my book Rise of the Sadducees I explore the history that explains such “influences”.

Copyright 2017. Daniel Santos
All Rights Reserved

ENDNOTES:

i Garrett, Amy C., “Highlights in the History of U.S. Relations With Russia, 1780-June 2006”. Office of the Historian. Bureau of Public Affairs. May 11, 2007. U.S. Department of State. April 26, 2017 https://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/200years/c30273.htm#rus_colony

ii This detail is paramount in American History. For it shows that the founders assumed the statehood of the United States before the promulgation of the US Constitution. As the United States’ statehood preceded the US Constitution, the US Constitution therefore cannot be the founding document of the United States. The Declaration of Independence thus remains the founding document of the United States, and thus, constitutes a legal document. Whether the founders proceeded correctly or not merits a different discussion. Our point here finds strong support from Harvard Historian David Armitage. Armitage “writes that the Declaration was the first document in world history ‘to make such an announcement of statehood in the language of independence’” (SLUGA, GLENDA. “Proclaiming Sovereignty.” Harvard International Review, vol. 29, no. 1, 2007, pp. 76–77., www.jstor.org/stable/43650194).

iii “Russia recognized the United States on October 28, 1803”. (U. S. Relations With Russia. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Fact Sheet. December 20, 2016. US Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3183.htm>)

iv Garret, Amy C., Op. Cit.

v Garrett, Amy C. Ibid.

vi Garrett, Amy C. Ibid.

vii Claude, Inis L. “The Balance of Power Revisited.” Review of International Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, 1989, pp. 77–85., www.jstor.org/stable/20097172;

viii Garrett, Amy C., Op. Cit.

ix U. S. Relations With Russia. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Op. Cit.

x “Although diplomatic relations were never formally severed, the United States refused to recognize or have any formal relations with the Bolshevik/Soviet governments until 1933” (U. S. Relations With Russia. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Ibid.)

xi Garrett, Amy C., Ibid.

xii Wikipedia contributors. "Declaration of war by the United States." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 28 Apr. 2017. Web. 30 Apr. 2017.

xiii Gaddis, John Lewis. “The Cold War: a New History”. Penguin, 2006.

xiv “The next major peaks in the graph track the Cold War proxy wars in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos” (Lacina, Bethany, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Bruce Russett. "The declining risk of death in battle." International Studies Quarterly 50.3 (2006): 673-680).

xv An example of this cooperation in the field of Space exploration and related sciences is “the Joint Working Group (JWG) on Space Biology and Medicine… The formation of the JWG provided an opportunity for the opening of a series of productive relationships between the superpowers, the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); and served as a justification for continued relationship for medical assistance in spaceflight, and to showcase Earth benefits from space medicine research … this group, which has been in continuous existence for over 40 years...” (Doarn, Charles R., et al. "A summary of activities of the US/Soviet-Russian joint working group on space biology and medicine." Acta Astronautica 67.7 (2010): 649-658”); For examples concerning engagement in sporting events and other cultural aspects, see: Wagg, Stephen, and David L. Andrews. East plays west: Sport and the Cold War. Routledge, 2007.

xvi Doarn, Charles R., et al. Ibid.

xvii Wirtz, James J. "Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons." Arms Control: History, Theory, and Policy [2 volumes]: History, Theory, and Policy (2012): 203.

xviii According to John Lewis Gaddis (2006), “The President had become convinced that Khrushchev’s missile claims were fraudulent” (Gaddis, John Lewis. Op. Cit.).

xix “Conceptualization of the Clash of Civilizations The cold war divided the world into the first, second and third world” (Ashraf, Mian Muhammad Tahir. "The clash of civilizations? A critique." Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) 32.2 (2012): 521-527). “Whereas the Cold War divided the world into two camps (or three if we consider the nonaligned states as a distinct camp) ” (Xenias, Anastasia. "Can a Global Peace Last Even If Achieved? Huntington and the Democratic Peace." International Studies Review 7.3 (2005): 357-386).

xx “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949”. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs. United States Department of State. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato>

xxi “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949”. Ibid.

xxii “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949”. Ibid.

xxiii “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949”. Ibid.

xxiv “A Short History of NATO” NATO. <http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm>

xxv “A Short History of NATO” NATO. Ibid.

xxvi “...shifts in power relations between governments are often the result of decisions that are made behind the veil of government secrecy” (Berger, Daniel, et al. “Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War.” The American Economic Review, vol. 103, no. 2, 2013, pp. 863–896., www.jstor.org/stable/23469685).

xxvii Text of the North Atlantic Treaty, as reported on NATO’s official website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm

xxviii “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen”. News Transcripts Multimedia. The Executive Branch of the Russian Government. 16 December 2009. <http://archive.government.ru/eng/docs/8600/>

xxix “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen”. Ibid.

xxx Mauer, Victor. “International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-).” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 78, no. 1, 2002, pp. 163–164., www.jstor.org/stable/3095996.

xxxi Rotfeld, Adam Daniel. “The Future of NATO.” Sicherheit Und Frieden (S F) / Security and Peace, vol. 25, no. 1, 2007, pp. 20–25., www.jstor.org/stable/24231646.

xxxii Mauer, Victor. Ibid.

xxxiii Mauer, Victor. Ibid.

xxxiv Text of the North Atlantic Treaty, as reported on NATO’s official website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm

xxxv Russia: 2014 Report on International Religious Freedom. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. US Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2014/eur/238426.htm>